Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Various phenomenological psychopathologists have proposed that delusional mood may not only precede but also contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved with the delusional mood have been considered central for the understanding of schizophrenic delusion. Ranging from traditional and contemporary phenomenological and neurobiological accounts, it has been often mentioned that the peculiar affective saliency of the world experience may underpin (...) the emergence of delusional mood. In this paper, I employ Edmund Husserl’s account of affection and affective syntheses to clarify the nature of such an experience and illuminate how this experiential abnormality contributes to the emergence of the delusional mood. I conclude by relating the phenomenological account I advance here with a neurobiological account of aberrant salience hypothesis and chart out a possible way toward mutual enlightenment for both approaches. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence by drawing on Kant’s incongruent counterparts as an analogy. Specifically, the paper posits two deterministic worlds that are superficially identical but ultimately different. Using ideas from Wittgenstein, Gödel, and Cantor, the paper defines “deterministic knowledge” and investigates how this knowledge is processed differently in those two worlds. The paper considers computationalism and causal determinism for the new framework. Then, the paper introduces new concepts to illustrate why (...) human and machine agents display different causal characteristics in processing verbal information. Overall, the paper’s framework provides a theoretical basis for the uniqueness of the human mind. (shrink)

Agent-centered morality has been a serious challenge to ethical theories based on agent-neutral morality in defining what is the moral point of view. In this paper, my concern is to examine whether arguments for agent-centered morality, in particular, arguments for agent-centered option, can be justified. -/- After critically examining three main arguments for agent-centered morality, I will contend that although there is a ring of truth in the demands of agent-centered morality, agent-centered morality is more problematic than agent-neutral morality. Nevertheless, (...) we need to take seriously the challenges to agent-neutral morality by finding a way to reflect the insight of agent-centered morality within the framework of agent-neutral morality without collapsing it into agent-centered morality. As a way of doing so, I suggest that we need to integrate the situated, rather than transcendental, nonideal, rather than idealized, and dialogical, rather than monological, perspectives developed in feminist ethics, into agent-neutral morality. (shrink)

A one-stop resource on the current developments in word order research, this comprehensive survey provides an up-to-date, critical overview of this widely debated topic, exploring and evaluating research carried out in four major ...

It is widely held that there is an asymmetry between our access to our minds and our access to others’ minds. Philosophers in the literature tend to focus on the asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states of others that are not shared by us. What if a mental state can have multiple subjects? Is there still an asymmetry between our access to our mental states and our access to those mental states (...) of others that are also ours? In this paper, I discuss the implications of a case of shared consciousness—the case of the Hogan twins—for asymmetry. I start by clarifying the notion of asymmetry. Here I develop a characterization of asymmetry and argue that it is preferable to the standard approaches in the literature. I then present the twins’ case and argue that it does not threaten asymmetry. I close by drawing some lessons. (shrink)

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. It posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other a machine agent. These agents exhibit different information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. Providing a conceptual modeling of their difference, this paper resolves what it calls “the vantage point problem” – namely, how to justify an omniscient perspective through which a determinist asserts determinism from within the supposedly (...) deterministic universe. (shrink)

Temporal experience and its radical alteration in schizophrenia have been one of the central objects of investigation in phenomenological psychopathology. Various phenomenologically oriented researchers have argued that the change in the mode of temporal experience present in schizophrenia can foreground its psychotic symptoms of delusion. This paper aims to further the development of such a phenomenological investigation by highlighting a much-neglected aspect of schizophrenic temporal experience, i.e., its non-emotional affective characteristic. In this paper, it denotes the type of an experience (...) wherein an afflicted individual experiences a pervasive pull or attraction coming from the past, present, and future. By employing Husserl’s account of affection, I argue that such an affectively prominent temporal experience is not yet another abnormality that happens to be present in schizophrenia. Instead, it is indicative of the core disturbance that underpins the schizophrenic temporal mode of experience. I identify such a disturbance as ‘affective modification dysfunction’ and employ it as a core concept with which I synthesize and organise heterogeneous components of schizophrenic temporal experience in their conceptual unity. For the sake of clear description, I organise those components into the following categories: 1.) Time Stop 2.) Ante-festum 3.) Déjà vu/vécu and 4.) Time Fragmentation. I conclude by demonstrating how approaching schizophrenic temporal experience from its affective dimension can further help us better understand its pre-psychotic phase known to precipitate schizophrenic primary delusion, i.e., delusional mood. (shrink)

This paper discusses the philosophical basis of mathematics by examining the perspectives of Kant and Hegel. It explores how Kant’s concept of the synthetic a priori, grounded in the intuitions of space and time, serves as a foundation for understanding mathematics. The paper then integrates Hegelian dialectics to propose a broader conception of mathematics, suggesting that the relationship between space and time is dialectically embedded in reality. By introducing the idea of a hypothetical transcendental subject, the paper attempts to overcome (...) a potential limitation of Kant’s framework, particularly regarding the application of mathematical truths to pre-human reality. This synthesis of Kantian and Hegelian thoughts offers a lens through which the connection between mathematics and reality can be understood, while also acknowledging limitations in both philosophical systems. (shrink)

Few would deny that something ontologically depends on something else. Given that something depends on something, what depends on what? Huayan Buddhism 華嚴宗, a prominent Chinese Buddhist school, is known for its extensive thesis of interdependence, according to which everything depends on everything else. This intriguing thesis is entangled with seemingly paradoxical claims that everything is not only identified with everything else but also contained within it. Moreover, the radical thesis of interdependence entails that dependence is pervasive and symmetric. In (...) this paper, I first develop a contemporary interpretation of Huayan interdependence by employing the definitional account of essence and the essence-based account of dependence. Through these contemporary resources, I elucidate and unify the theses of interdependence, mutual identity, and mutual containment within Huayan Buddhism. I then propose a unique framework of ontological dependence that suggests varying degrees of ontological dependence, aimed at accommodating and explaining away our intuitions against pervasive and symmetric dependence. By contemporizing Huayan Buddhism, I explore its potential and facilitate engagement between contemporary metaphysics and Huayan Buddhism. (shrink)

According to Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), the founder of the Chinese Buddhist Tiantai school 天台宗, “one object is all objects;” hence, all objects are profoundly interconnected. In this paper, I critically examine Zhiyi’s metaphysics of objects as presented in the historical Tiantai texts and subsequently develop a contemporary and accessible thesis of interconnectedness by integrating Zhiyi’s views with resources from contemporary analytic philosophy, particularly relative identity. By drawing on Zhiyi’s insights and incorporating contemporary philosophical ideas, I also illustrate how historical Chinese (...) Buddhism and contemporary analytic metaphysics can be mutually informing. (shrink)

When you have a conscious experience—such as feeling pain, watching the sunset, or thinking about your loved ones—are you aware of the experience as your own, even when you do not reflect on, think about, or attend to it? Let us say that an experience has “mineness” just in case its subject is aware of it as her own while she undergoes it. And let us call the view that all ordinary experiences have mineness “typicalism.” Recently, Guillot has offered a (...) novel argument for typicalism by leveraging the relation between self-knowledge and self-awareness. She starts by arguing that all ordinary experiences give their subjects immediate justification to believe that their experiences are their own. She then argues that this can be explained by typicalism. In this paper, I argue that her argument fails. I start by clarifying the notion of mineness and giving more details about her argument. I then explain why her argument fails by raising doubts about whether typicalism explains the target explanandum. I close by considering some implications of our discussion for self-knowledge. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. By drawing an analogy from Kant’s incongruent counterparts, it posits two deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. Using ideas from Wittgenstein and Gödel, the paper defines “deterministic knowledge” and investigates how this knowledge is processed differently in those worlds. By postulating the distinctiveness of human intelligence, this paper addresses what it refers to as “the vantage point problem” (...) – namely, how to make a qualitative distinction between the determinist and the universe where the determinist belongs. (shrink)

Since the transparency approach to introspection need not posit a dedicated mechanism specialized for detecting one’s own mental states, its economy is often viewed as a major advantage by both proponents and opponents. But sometimes economy comes at the cost of relying on controversial views of the natures of mental states. Perceptual experience is a case in point. For example, Alex Byrne’s account relies on the view that experience constitutively involves belief, and Matthew Boyle’s account relies on the view that (...) experience constitutively involves a form of implicit consciousness of experience. In this paper, I develop a transparency account of our access to our experiences that retains the benefit of economy while avoiding the cost of relying on controversial views of the nature of experience. I start by discussing Byrne’s and Boyle’s accounts. I focus on the problems that lead them to hold the controversial views they do, and raise some challenges to their solutions. I then develop my own account. I argue that when you attend to an object, your experience gives you justification to believe that you see the object (under some descriptions). I close by highlighting some advantages of my account. I argue that it (1) can solve the problems facing Byrne and Boyle without relying on controversial views of the nature of experience; (2) respects the idea that there is something special about our access to our minds; and (3) can be generalized to other cases of introspection. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker argues that a certain class of self-ascriptions is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns. In their “Self-Consciousness and Immunity,” Timothy Lane and Caleb Liang question Shoemaker’s view. Lang and Liang present a clinical case and an experiment and argue that they are counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. This paper is a response to Lane and Liang’s challenge. I identify the desiderata that a counterexample to Shoemaker’s view must meet and show that somatoparaphrenia and the Body (...) Swap Illusion fail to meet those desiderata. Thus, despite being puzzling phenomena, somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion are not counterexamples to Shoemaker’s view. (shrink)

This paper gives significance to the concept of continuity in addressing the contemporary mind-body problem. Building upon philosophical definitions and insights from empirical brain science, the paper argues for "ontology of continuity" as a way to bridge between the mental and physical. To overcome the challenge of Kim’s causal overdetermination, the paper introduces a dual-neural process model, where subjective experiences and neural activities co-depend and influence each other in a quasi-parallel manner. This model seeks to reconcile idealism and physicalism, proposing (...) that continuity serves as a fundamental ontological construct connecting the mental and physical realms. (shrink)

This paper explores the liar paradox and its implications for logic and philosophical reasoning. It analyzes the paradox using classical logic principles and paraphrases it as "affirmation of the falsity of the very affirmation." The study draws connections between the liar paradox and Hegel's speculative sentence and suggests it functions as a "quasi-speculative sentence." Additionally, it examines parallels with the logocentric predicament and the determinist's assertion, highlighting their paradoxical nature. Through these analyses, the paper aims to illuminate the fundamental paradoxes (...) in our reasoning and logic. (shrink)

This paper proposes a metaphysical framework for distinguishing between human and machine intelligence. By drawing an analogy from Kant’s incongruent counterparts, it posits two identical deterministic worlds -- one comprising a human agent and the other comprising a machine agent. These agents exhibit different types of information processing mechanisms despite their apparent sameness in a causal sense. By postulating the distinctiveness of human over machine intelligence, this paper resolves what it refers to as “the vantage point problem” – namely, how (...) to legitimize a determinist’s assertion of determinism by placing the determinist within the universe. (shrink)

Mindfulness training has been used to improve emotional wellbeing in early adolescents. However, little is known about treatment outcome moderators, or individual differences that may differentially impact responses to treatment. The current study focused on gender as a potential moderator for affective outcomes in response to school-based mindfulness training. Sixth grade students (N = 100) were randomly assigned to either the six weeks of mindfulness meditation or the active control group as part of a history class curriculum. Participants in the (...) mindfulness meditation group completed short mindfulness meditation sessions four to five times per week, in addition to didactic instruction (Asian history). The control group received matched experiential activity in addition to didactic instruction (African history) from the same teacher with no meditation component. Self-reported measures of emotional wellbeing/affect, mindfulness, and self-compassion were obtained at pre and post intervention. Meditators reported greater improvement in emotional wellbeing compared to those in the control group. Importantly, gender differences were detected, such that female meditators reported greater increases in positive affect compared to females in the control group, whereas male meditators and control males displayed equivalent gains. Uniquely among females but not males, increases in self-reported self-compassion were associated with improvements in affect. These findings support the efficacy of school-based mindfulness interventions, and interventions tailored to accommodate distinct developmental needs of female and male adolescents. (shrink)

1: Placebo effect sometimes plausibly has powerful effects. 2: Buddhism philosophy holds that every living animal is sentient, and has a consciousness and killing them is bad for the killer and freeing them is good somehow. Consciousness may involve some aspects of quantum mechanism as Roger Penrose’s Orch OR' theory of consciousness pointed out. -/- 3: Although previous studies show that there is no “demonstrable effects of distant intercessory prayer. Anecdotal cases of a special kind of Buddhist activity of freeing (...) captive animals in huge amount seem to have powerful therapeutic effects on severe and terminal patients. We want test it experimentally. 4: The cunning point that exceeds previous stuies is, it’s reasonable to consider there may be collective and superpositional effects of this activity due to the likely quantum mechanism of consciousness, and it may play as a sort of magnifying glass that shows a discernible placebo effect. -/- 5:We recruit a considerable number of patients that are terminally ill and the doctors said they can not help them anymore and have double-blind experiments of the above idea.The statistics may show some anomalous distribution. Ethical concerns shall take into consideration. (shrink)

The paper by Monteiro, Musten and Compson (2014) is to be commended for providing a comprehensive discussion of the compatibility issues arising from the integration of mindfulness – a 2,500-year-old Buddhist practice – into research and applied psychological domains. Consistent with the observations of various others (e.g., Dunne, 2011; Kang & Whittingham, 2010), Monteiro and colleagues have not only highlighted that there are differences in how Buddhism and contemporary mindfulness interventional approaches interpret and contextualize mindfulness, but there are also (...) differing interpretations of mindfulness within Buddhism. These apparent differences within Buddhism are arguably more noticeable when making comparisons across Buddhist vehicles (i.e., Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana), but to a lesser extent intra-vehicular differences can also be said to exist (i.e., differences between Buddhist traditions of the same vehicle). This commentary investigates the validity of some of these different Buddhist constructions of mindfulness, and then discusses how a better understanding of their scriptural and conceptual soundness (or lack thereof) may help to reconcile some of the actual and perceived incompatibility between Buddhist practice and contemporary secular mindfulness-based approaches. (shrink)